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CASE COMMENT.
TORTS: EXPOSING THE GOVERNMENT TO A RIPTIDE OF
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SWIMMERS
FloridaDepartment of NaturalResources v. Garcia,
753 So. 2d 72 (Fla.2000)
Keith Myers'
In FloridaDepartmentofNaturalResourcesv. Garcia,the Respondent
became a quadriplegic when he dove into the ocean at Miami Beach and
hit his head on submerged debris.' The Respondent claimed that the City
of Miami (the City), Dade County, and Petitioner (the State) were
negligent in their failure to remove the underwater debris or take necessary
preventative measures to protect swimmers.2 The trial court found the
State had not designated, and therefore not operated, the beach as a public
swimming area.3 Accordingly, the trial court found that if there was a duty
of care owed to the Respondent, the City owed the duty and not the State,
and granted summary judgment for the State.4 The Third District Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the State had a
nondelegable duty to operate the beach safely, even though the State did
not formally designate the area as a public swimming area.5 The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the judgment,6 and HELD that the State owed a
duty of care to the Respondent because the State expressly permitted the
City to operate the beach as a public swimming area according to the terms

* To my family, Drue and Devon, and ol' King Neptune.

1. See Florida Dep't of Natural Res. v. Garcia, 753 So. 2d 72, 73-74 (Fla. 2000) (5-2
decision). Respondent was injured at the "South Beach" section of Miami Beach, where the City
had planned to contract work for underwater debris removal at the site of a demolished pier. See
id. n. 1. The State and City had a 1982 management agreement which provided: that the State
"'holds title' to the beach property; granted the City "'management responsibilities"' of the beach
for twenty-five years; required the city to submit a "'management plan"' providing for "'the
limitation and control of land and water related activities such as boating, bathing, surfing, rental
of beach equipment, and sale of goods and services to the public;"' and required the City to pay the
State twenty-five percent of revenues collected from private concessionaires. See id. at 74
(emphasis omitted).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 76-77.
4. See idat 74.
5. See Garcia v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 707 So. 2d 1158, 1159-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
6. Florida Dep't of Natural Res., 753 So. 2d at 78. Certiorari was granted to resolve direct
conflict between Garcia, 707 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and Warren v. Palm Beach County,
528 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). See FloridaDep't of Natural Res., 753 So. 2d at 73.
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of the management agreement between the City and the State.7 At
common law, a possessor of land had a duty to inspect the premises and
warn an invitee' of dangerous conditions that were not open and obvious. 9
The possessor owed this duty of care to members of the public whom
entered land that was held open to them.' Historically, under the public
policy doctrine of sovereign immunity, government entities were shielded
from having a similar duty of care."
The Supreme Court of Florida was the first state court to judicially
abolish sovereign immunity in 1957.12 The Court declared that sovereign
immunity was an anachronism in light of the "business institution"
character of modem municipalities. 3 In 1975, the Florida legislature
enacted a waiver statute that further restricted sovereign immunity. 4
Subsequently, in Commercial CarrierCorp. v. Indian River County,' the
Florida Supreme Court interpreted the waiver statute in the context of
Florida common law and drew a distinction between the government's
"planning" function and the government's "operational function." 16
Sovereign immunity was held to still apply when the government
exercised its "planning" function, such as when the government engaged
in policy making and other discretionary acts.17 However, the Court held

7. See id.at 76. The instant Court also held that the management agreement, which provided
for the City to indemnify the State for the City's negligence, was not prohibited by statute. See id.
at 77 (citing FLA. STAT. § 726.28(18) (1999)). The City's negligence was not an issue in this
appeal. See id
8. An invitee is a "person who has an express or implied invitation to enter or use another's
premises, such as a business visitor or a member of the public to whom the premises are held
open." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 832 (7th Ed. 1999).
9. See FOWLER, HARPER, et al., THE LAW OF TORTS 234, 242-44 (1986).
10. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 425-26 (W. Page Keeton, ed. 1984).
11. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957) (en banc). The
doctrine of sovereign immunity is commonly viewed as having evolved from the English case
Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep.R. 359 (1788), where a county was held
immune from liability for a defective bridge. The policy basis for this reasoning was that imposing
liability on the sovereign translated into an unfair burden on the citizenry. See Hargrove, 96 So. 2d
at 132.
12. See id. at 133; see also David W. Case, From Pruett to Presley: The Long and Winding
Road to Abrogation ofCommon Law Sovereign Immunity in Mississippi, 63 MISS. L.J. 537, 542 &
n.28 (1994) (comparing Florida to Mississippi's approach to sovereign immunity).
13. See Hargrove, 96 So. 2d at 133. The HargroveCourt also pointed out that Florida had
distinguished its cases from the Men ofDevon case since 1850. See id.at 132 (citing Tallahassee
v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850) (imposing liability on an incorporated community not the same as
directly imposing such a burden on each individual citizen)).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 762.28 (1975). The statute specifies the extent of the waiver, including
liability "for tort claims in the same manner... as a private individual... ." See id § 762.28(5).
15. 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015-17 (Fla. 1979).
16. See id at 1010, 1017-22.
17. See id. at 1022.
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that sovereign immunity did not apply when the government exercised its
"operational functions," such as when the government maintained a traffic
light or a facility held open to the public. 8 Thus, once a government entity
chose to exercise its "operational" function, it was liable for negligence in
the same manner as a private individual or business. 9
In subsequent decisions relating to swimming areas, Florida courts
have attempted to determine when an "operational" duty of care arises."
In Andrews v. Department of NaturalResources,2 the appellant's minor
child drowned in an area where there were no lifeguards stationed or signs
posted to prohibit swimming.22 At trial, the issue was whether the State
had designated the area in question as a public swimming area? In
reversing summary judgment for the State, the Andrews court suggested
that the State could be found liable if, under the totality of the
circumstances, it had assumed a duty of care by operating the beach as a
public swimming area, even if it had not formally designated the area as
such.24
The Andrews decision 2 directly conflicted with the Fourth District's
prior ruling in Warren v. Palm Beach County.26 In Warren, the appellant

18. See id. (citing Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968) and Evangelical Brethren
Church v. State, 407 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1965) (developing and applying "planning" and
"operational" analysis)). The Florida statute made no such express distinction. See id at 1022.
19. See id. at 1018, 1020, 1022 (drawing line at this point adhered to separation of powers
doctrine). However, the waiver statute did cap damages at $100,000 and precluded punative
damages against the state. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1975). Damage awards in excess of this
limit may be granted by special claims act of the legislature. See id In the instant case, Respondent
received a $1.25 million award against the City. See Carol Miller, JusticesSay State Can be Sued
Over Accidents at Public Beaches, BROWARD COUNTY DAILY Bus. REV., Feb. 17, 2000, at Al.
20. See Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 1986) (holding
that Respondent's decision to operate an unsupervised swimming facility was not a discretionary
decision for which sovereign immunity applied).
21. 557 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
22. See id. at 86. The State of Florida acquired portions of Honeymoon Island from the City
of Dunedin after 1974, and opened a state recreation area. See id. The state removed signs which
warned of the strong current and prohibited swimming in the area of Dog Beach, where appellee's
son drowned. See id. at 87-88. The State placed signs which stated "'No lifeguard on duty. Swim
at own risk.,' but these signs were not visible along the path appellant took to the beach. See id.
at 88. Also, the state produced brochures, given to visitors upon entering the park, which
proclaimed "'The clear Gulf waters are enjoyed for swimming and sun bathing."' See id.
23. See id. There were at least two brochures published; only one showed a specifically
designated swimming area. See id It was disputed which brochure appellant received on the day
her son drowned. See id.
24. See id at 88-89. Testimony from park officials and lifeguards indicated that the State was
aware of the area's regular use by fisherman and swimmers. See id. at 88.
25. See id
26. 528 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
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became a quadriplegic after he dove into a shallow lake. 2" The court
concluded that Palm Beach County was immune from liability because it
did not post signs designating the site as a public swimming area.2" Thus,
because Palm Beach County did not post signs, it was conclusively not
"operating" a swimming area, and evidence of the area's common use for
swimming was not considered relevant by the Court. 29 However, to incur
liability under Andrews, the government entity need not overtly designate
an area as a public swimming area."
Because the Fourth District's rigid approach to establishing
government liability in Warren conflicted with the Second and Third
Districts' more flexible approaches in Andrews" and the instant case,32
respectively, the Supreme Court of Florida granted certiorari in the instant
case.33 In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the
State had waived its sovereign immunity because it had acted in its
operational capacity.34 The instant Court reasoned that the proper test to
determine whether the petitioner possessed an operational duty of care was
the totality of the circumstances and not whether the State had formally
designated the area as a public swimming area.35 Specifically, the Court's
analysis of the totality of the circumstances focused on whether the State
either held out South Beach as a public swimming area or caused the
public to reasonably believe South Beach was a designated a public
swimming area.36 In the instant case, the State had signed a management
agreement which allowed the City to operate South Beach as a public
swimming area; therefore, the State was clearly aware of such intended
use. 37 And since the State retained profits and managerial interests, it
incurred an operational-level duty of care.38

27. See id. at 414.
28. See id. at 415. A county ordinance stated that "Areas where [public] swimming is
permitted will be designated by official signs and markings." See id. (citing Ordinance No. 76-9).
Absent such actual designation, the ordinance prohibited swimming in "waters or waterways in or
adjacent to any park ....
See id.

29. See id The park rangers were instructed to discourage or prevent swimming, but there
were no signsprohibitingswimming, and the lake was commonly used for boating and water-skiing
despite the ordinance. See id. The county's decision not to operate a swimming facility was a
discretionary government function, where sovereign immunity applied. See id.
30. See Andrews v. Dept. of Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85, 87-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
31. See id. at 86-88.
32. See Garcia v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 707 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
33. See Florida Dep't of Natural Res. v. Garcia, 753 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 2000).
34. See id. at 76-77.
35. See id. at 76.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 74, 76.
38. See idat 75 (citing Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (Fla.
1986)) (stating that when government entity operates a swimming facility it assumes a common
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The instant Court explained that the State actions fell between two ends
of a spectrum. 9 At one end of the spectrum was a formal designation by
the State of an area as a public swimming area.4° At the other end of the
spectrum was an active prohibition by the State of swimming in a specific
area or lack of knowledge by the State that persons commonly swim in a
specific area.4 In the instant case, the State was aware that persons
commonly swam at South Beach. Furthermore, the petitioner retained
financial and managerial interests in the City's operation of South Beach
as a public swimming area.42
While the instant Court affirmed the Third District's ruling for the
Respondent, the majority rejected the Third District's dicta which
suggested that "common use" by persons alone could establish that the
State was acting in its operational capacity, and therefore, was liable.43
Instead, the instant Court, like the Andrews court" found that common use
was only one factor to be considered under the totality of the
circumstances test.45 In the instant case, the State's knowledge that South
Beach was commonly used for swimming, and the State's desire to profit
from or limit this activity, created a sufficient basis for the Respondent to
defeat summary judgment.46
The instant Court majority emphasized that its decision would not
create an excessive burden on the State. 47 The instant Court stated that its
rejection of the Third District's "common use" test in favor oftheAndrews
approach would limit the areas where the State had a duty of care to
swimmers to those areas where the State should reasonably have known
that public swimming was a common use or those areas where the
petitioner promoted swimming.4 Thus, the majority concluded that the
State would not be forced to post "No Swimming" signs along its entire
coastline as a result of the ruling.49
In the dissent, Justice Wells agreed that an area did not have to be
formally designated as a public swimming area for a duty of care to exist.50
However, he criticized the majority for not following the Court's

law duty
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

of care identical to private individual) (emphasis added).
See id. at 76-77.
See id.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 76.
See id at 77.
See Andrews v. Dep't of Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85, 87-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
See FloridaDep't of NaturalRes., 753 So. 2d at 76.
See id. at 77.
See id.
See id. at 76.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 78 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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precedent, which held that a government entity was immune from liability
unless it decided to directly operate a swimming facility." Justice Wells
argued that in the instant case, the State gave the City operational control
of the swimming area.52 Thus, the State's knowledge of, or profit from,
the City's operation was immaterial with respect to the State's liability.53
Because it did not operate the swimming facility, the petitioner did not
waive sovereign immunity.54 Justice Wells also expressed concern that the
majority's decision would harm the public policy goal of sovereign
immunity by exposing the State to liability along Florida's entire
coastline.55
Despite Justice Well's concerns, the instant Court's analysis56 adheres
to the modem rationale for imposing tort liability upon government
entities." Sovereign immunity has been waived by statute or judicially
abolished in the vast majority of states.5 Innocent tort victims can seek
redress, while the burden on the citizenry has been lessened by the
sovereign's "business institution" character and its use of insurance and
indemnification. Further, liability is only triggered where the sovereign
chooses to accept it by affirmatively acting in an operational capacity. 60
The instant Court's approval of the Andrews totality of the
circumstances test is also consistent with standard negligence theory,
which would apply once a court determines that a waiver of sovereign

51. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting) (citing Avallone v. County Bd. of Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d
1002, 1005 (Fla. 1986)).
52. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
53. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
54. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
55. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice Wells also criticized the Third District's
nondelegable duty analysis. See id. However, the petitioner did not challenge the Third District's
nondelegable duty ruling, and thus the instant Court did not address this issue of vicarious liability.
See id. at 78-79.
56. See id at 75.
57. See generallyCase, supra note 12 (describing Mississippi's law in evolution as it became
the forty-fifth state to abolish or limit sovereign immunity); William R. Hartl, Note, Sovereign
Immunity: An OutdatedDoctrineFacesDemise in a ChangingJudicialArena,69N.D. L. REV. 401
(1993) (explaining sovereign immunity history, judicial misapplications, and policy reasons for its
abolition).
58. See id.
59. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957) (en banc). The
management agreement also provided for the City to indemnify the State for losses arising from
the City's negligence. See Florida Dep't of Natural Res., 753 So. 2d at 77. The instant Court
concluded that the indemnification agreement did not violate state law. See id. (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 768.28(18) (1999)); see also Hartl,supranote 57, at 415-21 (discussing policy reasons to abolish
sovereign immunity in North Dakota).
60. See Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla.
1979).
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immunity is present.6 ' Thus, a possessor of land, including a government
entity, cannot escape a duty of ordinary care to invitees by claiming that
the absence of an express invitation or posted sign obviates such duty.62
Instead, the possessor's duty is based upon whether, under the
circumstances, a danger to invitees was known or foreseeable.63 Thus, as
in the instant case, when the State chose to "operate" a public swimming
area, it assumed a duty of ordinary care to swimmers like the
Respondent.'
Despite assurances that its decision will not result in an increased risk
of liability for the State along Florida's vast coastline, the instant Court
does not use any expressly limiting language to forestall such a risk.65 For
example, the Court particularly emphasizes the Petitioner's willingness to
share its revenue with the City as part of the South Beach management
agreement.66 Is the Court suggesting that merely sharing profits is an
automatic liability trigger, or must further control be exerted, such as in
the instant case where the State retained the option to perform some
management duties? 7 Also, the instant Court suggests that the State
cannot claim imnmunity from suit where the area is "well known" for
public swimming and the State derives a profit.68 However, it is not clear
whether the State must derive a profit, or whether an area's description as
"well known" is an independent determinant of liability.69 The term "well
known" is one of art, and does not describe which party, the State or the
public, must have the required knowledge.7"
The instant Court concludes that the "basis for the State's liability" is
that the State granted the City the right to operate South Beach as a public

61. See Florida Dep't of Natural Res., 753 So. 2d at 75-76 (citing Andrews v. Dep't of
Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)). Cf Commercial CarrierCorp., 371 So. 2d
at 1021-22 (distinguishing between "discretionary" government functions and "operational"
functions, and finding sovereign immunity not applicable to the latter). See also supranote 18 and
accompanying text.
62. See supranote 26 and accompanying text. But cf Warren v. Palm Beach County, 528 So.
2d 413, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (requiring express designation as swimming area for imposition
of liability).
63. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 426. Reasonable care is an implied
representation to all invitees. See id. (emphasis added).
64. See FloridaDep 't of NaturalRes., 753 So. 2d at 75.
65. See id.at 77.
66. See id. at 76.
67. See id.at 76 & n.3.
68. See id. at 77. The instant Court rejected the "common use" standard of the Andrews court
in favor of the "well known" standard, apparently emphasizing a knowledge requirement.
See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
69. See id.
70. See id. Also, no reasonableness or actual knowledge standard is described. See id.
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swimming area. 7 The Court actually requires more though and places
emphasis on the State's ability to limit the City's operation and to share in
the City's profits. 72 These sequential statements in the opinion are
potentially confusing and, arguably, contradictory." The first statement
suggests a nondelegable duty, while the subsequent qualifying statements
are consistent with the totality of the circumstances approach used in
Andrews74 and endorsed by the instant court."' Thus the court left unclear
when the State can effectively delegate an operational duty of care to the
City short of maintaining a completely hands-off posture.76
Justice Wells sets forth a slightly clearer guiding rationale in his
dissent, arguing that premises liability is based upon who possesses the
land and not who owns the land.77 He argues that the State-owner is not
liable when it delegates operational control to the City-possessor.7
However, he does not explain where the line of liability is drawn in
instances where the State-owner profits from or maintains
some control
79
over a City-possessor's use of the owner's premises.
Ultimately, neither the majority nor the dissent establishes clear
guidelines for determining when a government entity is operating a public
swimming area. A useful set of specific factors to consider could have
been outlined, such as whether the State still maintained control, and to
what extent, or whether the State shared in the profits of the operation."0
In the absence of further judicial or legislative clarification, Florida's
lower courts are likely to continue to struggle with deciding when a
government entity has assumed an operational duty of care in factually
similar scenarios.8" Specifically, guidance is needed with respect to what
defines a "well known" swimming area, whether sharing profits is by itself

71. See id. 76.
72. See id. at 76 (stating "[n]ot only did the State agree to the operation .... but it put
limitations on the terms of the operation and demanded twenty-five percent of the revenues").
73. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
74. See Andrews v. Dep't of Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85, 86-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
75. See Florida Dep' of NaturalRes., 753 So. 2d at 75-76.
76. See id. at 75-78.
77. See id. at 79-80 (Wells, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 80 (Wells, J., dissenting).
79. See id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
80. The instant court does not describe the State-City relationship as analogous to parentsubsidiary interactions in the corporate context. However, such an analogy might be useful, since
the parent is expected to share in profits with the subsidiary, but parent liability is limited by the
extent of control and participation it exerts on the subsidiary. Cf United States v. Best Foods, 524
U.S. 51, 67-69 (1998). (applying parent-subsidiary concepts in the corporate context). Given the
modem "business institution" character of local government entities, this would seem to be a
relevant analogy. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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a liability trigger, and to what extent operational control may be
delegated.82
While it is important to allow innocent tort victims to seek redress,
government entities, as public lands trustees, need some foreseeable limit
to their liability, short of building a fence around every potentially
hazardous shoreline.83 In the meantime, Florida's expansive shorelines
to present hazards for both unwary swimmers and the
will continue
84
government.

82. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 49, 59 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 48-49, 55 and accompanying text.

